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Abstract 
The Fisherian Time Preference and the Evolution of 
Capital Ownership Patterns in a Global Economy 
Kyoji Fukao and Koichi Hamada 
Conventionally economic growth theory was based on the assumption of a 
constant rate of time preference. Uzawa (1968) and Obstfeld (OJE, 1981) 
introduced the rate of time preference that increases with the utility 
level. Irving Fisher (The Theory of Interest) has a different opinion, 
however, that people are more time impatient at the lower level of income. 
This paper assumes a non-monotonic time preference schedule such that 
people are more patient at the middle income levels and are less patient 
when they are either very poor or rich. Based on a nonlinear savings 
function out of wealth implied by such a time-preference schedule, this 
paper develops a single-good, multi-country growth model of a global 
economy with free capital mobility. The long-i'.'un property of this system 
is characterized by three kinds of long-i'.'un equilibrium: the starvation 
(fatal attractor) equilibrium, the imperialism equilibria dominated by a 
nation or by a group of nations, and the CO::Prosperity equilibrium where 
the wealth and the income of countries in the system grow proportionately. 
Bifurcation phenomena and the global stability of the system by the 
Lyapunov function will be discussed. 
Our system has a strong resemblance to some models of ecology where 
species compete for their survival (Robert May, Stability and Complexity in 
Model Ecosystems). Here we can properly analyze the transition of a debtor 
to a creditor country from a global perspective, and make a case for the 
pump-priming foreign aid or debt relief policy. 
1 
I. Introduction 
If one's income level improves, will one become more time patient or 
less patient? Many prominent economists discussed this question and the 
literature of modern economic growth theory explicitly or implicitly 
assumed some relationship between the level of current economic welfare and 
the rate of time preference. 
Milton Friedman (1957) expressed his view on this matter by drawing a 
homothetic indifference map for the intertemporal choice of consumption, 
which implies a constant rate of time preference regardless of the income 
level. He proceeded even to suggest the absence of "time preference 
proper," in other words, the zero rate of pure time preference when "the 
consumer unit correctly assesses the relative value of consumption in the 
two years" (Friedman, 1957, p. 12). 
For a long time economic growth theory had been based on this 
behavioristic assumption of a constant rate of time preference, until Uzawa 
(1968), inspired by Koopmans (1960), introduced the rate of time preference 
that was an increasing function of the instantaneous consumption level. 1 
Recent works (e.g. Obstfeld, 1981) utilized this structure to analyze the 
process of the international asset accumulation. The rationale of this 
assumption is rarely, however, systematically explicitly stated. Behind 
this assumption, we believe, is hidden the presumption that the asset 
holding behavior of economic units or of national economies should exhibit 
such a pattern that they achieve a certain target level of wealth relative 
Koopmans did not deny the possibility that the rate of time preference 
might be a decreasing function of the instantaneous utility. See Koopmans, 
Diamond, and Williamson (1964), p. 98. Iwai (1972) pursues this line of 
research from a somewhat similar viewpoint as ours. 
1 
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to income even under a constant return on capital over time. Decreasing 
rates of time preference with respect to instantaneous consumption would 
produce unstable asset holding behavior that could hardly be reconciled 
with the real balance effect. 
Irving Fisher, father of modern theory of consumption choice over 
time, had a different message. It seems worth quoting his argument as a 
whole even at the risk of slight redundance. 
"Our first step, then, is to show how a person's time-preference 
depends on the size of his income. In general, it may be said that 
the smaller the income the higher is the preference for present over 
future income. It is true that a small income implies a keen 
appreciation of future wants as well as of immediate wants. Poverty 
bears down heavily on all parts of a man's life, both that which is 
immediate and that which is remote. But it enhances the utility of 
immediate income even more than of future income. This result is 
partly rational, because of the importance, by supplying present 
needs, of keeping up the continuity of life and the ability to cope 
with the future; and partly irrational, because the pressure of 
present needs blinds one to the needs of the future. As to the 
rational side, it is clear that present income is absolutely 
indispensable, not only for the present, but even as a precondition to 
the attainment of future income. 'A man must live.' Any one who 
values his life would prefer to rob the future for the benefit of the 
present, so far, at least, as to keep life going. If one has only one 
loaf of bread he would not preserve it for next year; for if he did he 
would starve in the meantime. A single break in the thread of life 
suffices to cut off all the future. And not only is a certain minimum 
3 
of present income necessary to prevent starvation, but the nearer this 
minimum is approached the more precious does present income appear, 
relatively to future income. 
As to the irrational side, the effect of poverty is often to 
relax foresight and self-control and tempt one to trust to luck for 
the future, if. only the all-absorbing clamore of present necessities 
is satisfied 
We see, then, that a low income tends to produce a high 
time-preference, partly from lack of foresight and self-control, and 
partly from the thought that provision for the present is necessary 
both for itself and for the future as well." 
[Fisher, 1907, Ch. 6; section 5.] 
At least, for a low level of income, Fisher's argument seems to be 
convincing. (For psychological evidence see Maital, 1982). A casual look 
of the scatter diagram of the savings ratio and GNP per captia (Figure 1) 
tells us that the saving function is not necessarily a constant or a linear 
function of the real income level. Even though we exclude the extreme 
observation of the very low savings ratio of Lesotho, 2 we obtain a mild fit 
of a nonlinear savings function (see Figure 2). 
Thus, it seems reasonable to assume a nonlinear savings schedule as 
well as a nonlinear time-preference schedule such that people are more time 
impatient at the lower levels of income, become more patient at the middle 
levels, and then gradually becomes less patient. The purpose of this paper 
is not to assess the empirical relationship between savings ratios or rates 
Incidentally, it is interesting to note that another outlier in this 
diagram is the United States that saves significantly less than the overall 
average saving ratio. 
2 
4 
of time preference and the level of income, but to explore the consequence 
of the nonlinear savings behavior resulting from the nonlinear time 
preference schedule. The time preference schedule we consider can be 
depicted as in Figure 3. The declining portion of the schedule 
corresponding to lower income levels captures the remarks of Irving Fisher; 
the increasing portion corresponding to higher income levels captures the 
behavior analyzed by Uzawa and Obstfeld. 
By assuming a nonlinear savings function out of wealth implied by such 
a nonlinear time-preference schedule, we will develop a nonlinear 
single-good, multi-country growth model of a global economy. 3 This system 
can be regarded, in a broader sense, as a multi-country version of the 
nonlinear growth models developed by Leibenstein (1954) and Nelson (1956) 
in the earlier years of the development of economic growth theory. By 
allowing nonlinear savings behavior and studying global rather than local 
behavior of the system, we will be able to characterize the long-i:'un 
behavior of this multi-country growth model of the Solow (1956) variety. 
(See Day (1982, 1983) for a more complex single country model.) In 
particular, we will discuss three kinds of long-i:'un equilibrium: the 
starvation (fatal attractor) equilibrium, the imperialism equilibria 
dominated by a nation or by a group of nations, and the co:4?rosperity 
equilibrium where the wealth and the income of countries in the system grow 
proportionately. Incidentally our system has a strong resemblance to some 
The nonlinearity exploited in this paper concerns the savings behavior. 
On the other hand, most of the nonlinearity in Leibenstein's work, and part 
of the nonlinearity in Nelson's, stems from the population behavior. 
However, the global qualitative property of a multi-country version of 
their models would be similar to ours. 
3 
5 
of the models of ecology where species compete for their survival (see, 
e.g. May, 1973, also Haken 1983, chapter 10). 
Our analysis is global in the two different meanings of the word. It 
is concerned with the development of the total world economy instead of 
that of participating countries; it also takes account of the dynamical 
property of the system in the large instead of the local stability in the 
neighborhood of an equilibrium. 
In Section 2, we will discuss the relationship between the 
non-monotonic rate of time preference and the savings behavior. In Section 
3, we will present a simple growth model of world capitalism with perfect 
capital mobility and sketch the dynamic property of the model with the 
monotonic savings behavior. We begin our analysis of the non-monotonic 
savings behavior in a two country setting in Section 4. The concepts of 
starvation equilibrium, imperialistic equilibria and CO::Prosperity 
equilibrium will be introduced and the possibility of bifurcations as well 
as the global property of the model will be discussed. In Section 5, we 
will illustrate the global characteristics of a three-country model by 
simulating dynamic paths of the asset accumulation, and the Lyapunov 
stability of a simplified version of the multi-country model. The economic 
implications of our global analysis will be summarized in the concluding 
section. 
II. Varying Time Preference and Nonlinear Savings Behavior 
In order to discuss the microfoundation of the savings behavior to be 
introduced below, let us consider a representative family that solves the 
following optimization problem: 
6 
co 
max J e -otln{c(t) }dt, (1) 
{c(t)} o 
subject to: 
x(t) = {r(t) - n}x(t) - c(t), (2) 
x(o) x(o), (3) 
x(t)?; 0, (4) 
and 
c(t)?; 0. (5) 
Here o is the rate of time preference for the representative family, which 
we assume to be constant at this outset of our discussion. c(t) and x(t) 
are respectively per capita consumption and per capita wealth at time t, 
r(t) is the rate of return of wealth at time t, and n is the rate of 
population growth rate. The necessary conditions to these optimization 
problems are given by the combination of (2), 
i(t) ~ A(t)(o + n - r(t)), (6) 
and 
c(t) 1/A(t) 
along with the transversality conditions 




-c5tlim ).(t) x(t)e 0. (8) 
t~ 
where ).(t) denotes the current value of the marginal contribution of the 
state variable x(t) to the utility. 
Under the assumption of logarithmic instantaneous utility, (6) can be 
written as 
c<t) (r(t) - n - o)c(t) ( 6,) 
which, in combination with (2), gives the consumption behavior proportional 
to wealth 
c(t) ox(t). (9) 
The resulting dynamical equation can be written as 
x<t) {r(t) - o - n}x(t). (10) 
This neat form of equation (10) stems from our assumption of 
logarithmic instantaneous utility function. 4 If we relax this assumption 
even slightly, we will no longer obtain a simple relationship between 
In fact, this equation gives a microeconomic foundation for a strategic 
analysis conducted in Hamada (1965) in which game theoretic interactions 




wealth and consumption. 5 Since we are mainly concerned with the global 
rather than local property of the dynamical system, explicit 
characterization like (10) would help our analysis a great deal. 
It would be ideal if the neat form of equation (10) carries through in 
the case of varying, non-monotonic time preference. Even with the 
simplifying assumption of logarithmic utility, the wealth accumulating 
equation does not take a simple closed form like (10) if we allow o to 
depend on the value of c. 
In order to analyze the long-term and global consequence of 
non-monotonous savings behavior of many nations, we postulate in the main 
part of our paper (Section 4) that savings behavior of jth nation is 
governed by the following equations 
x. Ct) (r(t) -6.(x.(t)) -n} x.(t) j=l, ... ,J (11)
J J J J 
where r(t) is the rate of returns to physical capital x.(t) that is 
J 
identical for all the nations due to the reasons to be explained in the 
next section. This time o.() is a function defined not on the consumption
J 
For example, assume a Paretian utility 
-y 
U(c(t)) = _C~(t-)__ 0 < -y < 1,
-y 




In this case c(t) depends not only on x(t) but also on the whole future 
time path of the interest rate. 
9 
level but on the level of physical wealth x.(t). The shape of o.(x.(t))
J J J 
is, however, assumed to be like the rate of time preference schedule drawn 
in Figure 3. In other words, we will assume in later sections that o.()
J 













where x.* is the turning point of the savings behavior from the Fisherian to 
J 
the Uzawa region. 
The main reason why we consider the accumulation process of physical 
capital is for the sake of analytical ease. At the same time, this 
assumption gives our analysis a flavor of the exercise on the long 
discussed world imperialism in which capitalists compete for concentration 
of physical capital. Also readers who are keenly concerned with the 
microfoundation of any macroeconomic models may feel frustrated because our 
microfoundation appears to fall short of the satisfactory standard except
I 
for the case of constant rate of time preference. We hope, however, that 
intriguing consequences to be presented below will justify at least partly 
the worthiness of this somewhat bold intellectual experiment. 
III. A Model of World Imperialism with Monotonic Savings Behavior 
Let us construct a multi-country growth neoclassical model that sheds 
light on the long-i'."un property of the asset-liability structure among 
nations. J countries produce the same good by identical linear homogeneous 
well-behaved production functions. 
10 
Y. (t) F(K. (t), L. (t)) L.(t)f(k.(t)), j=l, ... ,J, (12)
J J J J J 
where Y.(t), K.(t), L.(t), and k.(t) = K.(t)/L.(t) are respectively output,
1 1 1 1 1 1 
capital stock, labor, and per-capita capital stock of the jth country at 
time t. f(k.(t)) is a per-capita production. Assume that labor force is 
1 
growing at an identical exponential rate of n, that is L.(t) = L(O)ent,
1 
where we set just for simplicity that the relative scale of each nation is 
exactly identical. 
Assume capital movements take place freely in such a way as to equate 










f'(k.(t)) f'(k.(t)) r(t) for all i and j (13)
1 J 
that implies k.(t) = k.(t) = k(t).
1 J 
Let x.(t) indicate the per-capita capital stock owned by the j'th
J 
nation. The net per-capita net foreign asset z.(t) owned by the j'th
J 
nation is written as 
z. (t) x. (t) - k(t). (14)
J J 
We will conduct our analysis in terms of x.(t) rather than z.(t). Needless 
J J 
to say, z.(t) is negative if the j'th country is a debtor country.
J 
11 
We combine the savings behavior (11) with this simple growth model. 6 
The system of differential equations becomes 
x. (t) {r(t) - o(x. (t)) - n}x. (t), j=l, ... ,J (15)
J J J 
J 
where r(t) = f'(k(t)) and k(t) = I x.(t)/J. 
j=l J 
Before going into a general analysis of the system with non-monotonic 
savings behavior, let us start, as a preliminary step, with a two-country 
model (J = 2) accompanied by simpler types of savings behavior 
corresponding to a constant rate of time preference and that of 
monotonously increasing consumption out of physical wealth. 
(i) Constant o. in savings function (15)
J 
Suppose oj is constant in (11). If o.'s are identical for two 
J 
countries, say o o2 , then the phase diagram of the pair of differential1 
equations (15) (J 2) looks like Figure 4(a). The initial relative 
ownership pattern will reproduce itself. Suppose next o < o
2
, then the1 
phase diagram will look like 4(b). The economy will eventually settle to 
the imperialism (sink) solution with country 1 as the empire and country 2 
as the colony unless the initial condition happens to be at B, an unstable 
This model is an open version of the Solow growth model (Solow 1956) 
with the Kaldorian savings faction (Kaldor 1955). For a treatment of this 
type of model see Hamada (1965, 1966). For open growth models with saving_ 
functions proportional to income, see also, for example, Onitsuka (1974) 
and Ruffin (1979). 
6 
12 
solution. This is a special case of the phenomenon that more patient 
individuals eventually own the whole world (Ramsey 1928, Bewley 1982, Ryder 
1985). Equilibrium A and B corresponds to the stable and unstable 
equilibrium discussed in the strategic analysis with o. as strategies in 
J 
Hamada (1965). This abnormality was cleverly avoided in Buiter (1981) 
because he analyzed the overlapping generation model. There the difference 
of the rate of time preference has only a limited effect because the chain 
of planning for the future was blocked by the lack of intergenerational 
linkage. 
(ii) Increasing o. as a function of the net wealth 
i 
If o. is a monotonic increasing function of wealth x.(t), then the 
i i 
phase diagram will look like 4(c). It can be shown that x (t) = 0 locus is1 
steeper than x2(t) = 0 locus. The economy will approach to a CO:j)rosperity 
solution C. The local behavior around C is thoroughly analyzed by Kawai 
and Okumura (1988). 
The age old discussion of the transformation of a country from debtor 
through creditor to mature creditor should be analyzed from this type of 
global perspective rather than from a small-country perspective because all 
the countries cannot end as creditors on the globe which is by itself a 
closed system. It is amusing to see that competitive species models in 
ecology have identical analytical structure, and that exactly the same 
phase diagrams are written for those models (See Haken, 1968, p. 307). 
IV. Nonmonotonic Savings Behavior and Imperialistic Equilibria 
Let us develop a two-country model of the world economy with free 
capital movements by introducing a non-monotonic savings behavior. Since 
13 
the nonlinearity could create rather complicated interaction, we will 
illustrate the global structure of the model by the following numerical 
example. Consider a world consisting of symmetric countries. Technology 
as well as consumption function is identical in the two countries. The 
only possible difference is in their initial wealth. We may conceive it as 
two classes of economics, capitalist and labor. The labor class consumes 
all their income, and the non-human capital is owned by capitalists. 
The per-capita production function we adopt is: 
f(k(t)) 
where k(t) lf _f x.(t)} 
21J=l J 
The rate of return r(t) is thus given by 
1 
r(t) ~(t) - 2 
4./2 
1Let n = or 1.25 percent. The o.(x.(t)) is symmetric between the two80 J J 
countries, so that we can write it without subscript for the function 
x. (t)
Jo(x.(t)) 800J 
Thus the dynamical equation for capital accumulation becomes 
14 
12 - -1 2x. (t) {tr I x.<t)JJ j=l J 
j 1, 2. 
Then the phase diagram of this system is drawn as Figure 5. There are 
three kinds of stable equilibria: the co-prosperity eguilibrium C, the 
imperialism equilibria (A with country 1 as the empire and country 2 as the 
colony, and B with country 2 as the empire and country 1 as the colony), 
and the starvation (fatal attractor) eguilibrium 0. There are one unstable 
equilibrium F and four saddle-point equilibria D, E, G, and H. The phase 
plane can be divided into four regions by the ridge (water-shed) lines FG, 
FH, FI and FJ as in Figure 6. From Region I, the path converges eventually 
to the co-prosperity equilibrium C; from Region II and III, the path 
converges respectively to A and B the imperialism equilibria; and alas from 
Region IV to the starvation equilibrium at the Origin! 
It is easy to check that, in the closed economy consisting of a single 
economy Nation 1, point F' (projection of Fon x axis) is the unstable1 
equilibrium and C' the stable equilibrium. For the sake of the existence 
of the foreign nation, Nation 2, the survival region where nation 1 is 
capable of avoiding starvation is extended to the regions with horizontal 
shade. Figuratively, in Region FGF' Nation 1 can take off because it can 
exploit the existence of Nation 2 because of the relative wealth at the 
initial point; in Region HFF" surrounding B, labor in nation 1 can survive 
because of the colonization by Nation 2. 
Similarly, Region surrounded by F"FJ with vertical shade implies that 
Nation 1 starting from this region can attain nothing but the colonized 
15 
equilibrium Bin this world economy even though Nation 1 could attain the 
state corresponding to C in the absence of Nation 2 after a long while. 
This path may as well be the Pareto efficient path. Needless to say, the 
Pareto efficiency does not exclude the situation in which one nation is 
colonized. In this region, Nation 1 may choose to close the economy 
against foreign capital, and after a while, may move to Region I. From 
there Nation 1 can adopt a free capital movement policy to attain the 
co-prosperity equilibrium C. 
Finally, one would be able to imagine the situation when a Nation, say 
Nation 1 suddenly becomes more frugal. Then x (t) = 0 contour GFECDA will
1 
shift to the right, point C and D will move to the right and finally 
collapse into a single point (see Figure 7). At that tangency point a 
bifurcation phenomenon will take place and the co-prosperity equilibrium 
will vanish from the globe, leaving only the possibility of the 
imperialistic equilibria. 
Needless to say, this analysis is only an illustration of a typical 
case. More general analysis can be done, for example, utilizing the 
topological approach explained in Hirsch and Smale (1977). 
V. The Global Property of the Multi-Country Model. 
We can extend the above exercise into three or more country cases. In 
order to visualize the global property of a three-country case, let us take 
the symmetric example with the same production function as in the previous 
section. Then the basic differential equations become 
1
3 x. (t)1 1 -2X. (T) {-- r3 I x.<t)J [ J800J 4jT j=l J 
16 
In this case there are 8 stable long--i:'un equilibria: 
(i) 1 co:::Prosperity eguilibrium 
(ii) 3 oligarchy eguilibria, each of which has two empires and 
one colony. 
(iii) 3 imperialism eguilibria, each of which has one empire and two 
colonies. 
(iv) 1 starvation eguilibrium. 




can be divided into 8 regions. Our simulation exercises give the following 
pictures. 
If we slice the space by simplexes, or more rigorously magnified 
simplexes, such that 
3 
I X. M,Jj=l 
and if we reduce the number M, then the initial condition can be divided as 
shown in 8(a) to 8(d). Suppose we approach this three dimensional space 
from the distance towards the origin. First, if M > 1.68, then we will 
observe the initial points leading to all the seven equilibria but the 
starvation eguilibrium (Figure 8(a)). If 1.68 > M > 0.717, the initial 
points leading to starvation eguilibrium will replace those leading to the 
co-prosperity equilibrium. If 0.717 > N > 0.173, then those leading to 
oligarchy equilibria will disappear. Finally, of course, if 0.173 > M, 
then the simplex will shrink further leaving no room for survival on this 
globe. 
17 
Then, can we say nothing about the global property of these nonlinear 
models? The work of ecologists (e.g. May 1973) teaches us that we can at 
least handle the following simple case with linear increasing function o(x) 
and the quadratic technology. 
Consider a multi-country model with the production technology 
f(k) a > 0 
J 
where k x./J, and saving function (15) with o(x) px, p > 0.I 
Jj=l 
That is, 
x. {r(k) -n -px.}x., j=l, ... ,J (16)
J J J 
where r(k) = f' (h) = - k + a. 
Then the system of the nonlinear equation (16) can be written as 
J 
x. {a - n - I a. X } X., 
J Jm m Jm=l 
-1 -1
where a. . = p + J , and a. J for j ,,r, k. 
JJ Jill 
Ila. II is a symmetric matrix and positive definite. Assume a - n > 0,
Jm 
and define the unique co-prosperity equilibrium x* = (x* 1 , x* 2 , ... , x*) where3 
x.* = (a -n)/(p+l). Then the following magnitude satisfies the conditions 
J 
of Lyapunov function: (see, e.g. Haken 1983, pp. 124-125. 
L 
JI {xJ. - x * . in x . } - L 
j=l J J 
18 
J 
where L = I { X • * - X.* in X • } • * 
J J Jj=l 
(i) Lis non-negative and vanishes at x,* 




= - I (xJ. - xJ.)* a. (x - x*) :S O with equality only at x* Jm m mj ,m 
Hence, the system is globally stable (May 1973, pp. 54-55, see also 
Lucas and Stokey 1984 for a discrete analogue of this problem with two 
economic agents.). 7 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
By introducing a non-monotonic savings schedule, we have seen that the 
process of economic developments can be formulated into a dynamical model 
similar to models of competing species in ecology. Despite its rather 
simple set of assumptions and dynamical apparatus, this model suggests a 
wide range of economic implications. We will list some of them as follows. 
(1) The old debate on the stages of economic development related to the 
shift from a debtor status to a lender status (cf Onitsuka 1974). Since 
every country cannot become net lenders at the same time within the (by 
itself, closed) world economy, we need a general equilibrium or 
global-scale analysis like the one analyzed in this paper. Depending on 
the relative propensity of savings and on the stage of income levels, such 
The reasoning holds if Ila. II is positive definite regardless whether it
Jm 
is symmetric. Also the following function will also serve as a Lyapunov 
function: 
L* I (xJ. - x.)* a. (x - x*) . 
jm J Jm m m 
7 
19 
a development of borrowing or lending phases can actually be explained by 
the arrows in the phase diagrams that cross the forty-five degree line. 
(2) Initial conditions on capital endowments have crucial effect on the 
long--t"un destiny of a nation. Depending on which side of the water-shed 
curve a nation places itself at the initial moment, the long--t"un path of 
the nation may take completely different directions. Random shocks into 
the system may alter the destiny of a nation from a path towards an empire 
or co-prosperity to a path towards a colonized nation, if we disregard the 
path towards starvation. In this vein, a case may be made for a 
pump-priming foreign aid and a debt relief to troubled developing 
countries. If the Fates push a nation into the path towards a colonized 
nation or towards starvation, why not let an angelic hand help salvage the 
nation into being a region of future co-prosperity? Even though the 
absolute magnitude of aid or relief is small, if it is done in the 
neighborhood of the critical water shed line, then the nonlinearity of the 
system may enable the nation to enjoy a long lasting economic benefit. 
(3) The savings behavior has a crucial influence on the long--t"un state of a 
national economy. If, in Japan, or in Newly Industrialized Economies 
(NIEs), the saving propensity dramatically rises, then the bifurcation 
phenomenon explained above may emerge and push these countries into a 
long~un owners of the world capital. On the other hand, if the savings 
propensity of, say the United States or the United Kingdom, were to decline 
for any reason such as fiscal deficits, then the country would fall into 
the debtor's trap towards possible colonization by high savings countries 
20 
(see Hamada and Iwata, 1989, for some possible scenarios regarding the 
United States, Japan and West Germany). 
Needless to say, there is no contradiction between the colonization of 
a part of the world and Pareto optimality. As suggested in Section 2, the 
non-linear savings behavior may be a result of optimizing behavior. The 
global outcome may well be Pareto optimal given certain initial conditions. 
The phase diagrams for the two-country case and simulation analysis 
for the three-country case clarifies the benefit and cost of living in a 
world community with other nations. A nation that would not survive in 
absence of other nations may be able to survive because of the presence of 
other nations that function as possible lenders or borrowers. On the other 
hand, a nation that would be able to achieve the long;:-un development 
corresponding to the co-prosperity equilibrium may end up being colonized 
if a rich nation exists along with her. The existence of a partner 
elevates the level of insurance against starvation of a nation, but 
enhances the risk of being victimized as her colony. The phase diagrams 
indicate the significance of inequality as well as that of poverty. 
(5) Under the above circumstances, there is some case for protectionist 
policy on the part of the developing country against foreign investment. 
By closing the country against foreign capital, a country may carry itself 
to the region from which opening of the country would lead to the 
co-prosperity equilibrium. In that circumstance, xenophobia or 
protectionism against foreign capital may prevent the colonization of the 
country in the long run though at the sacrifice of the present national 
consumption level; 
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We do not intend to defend ourselves against all the possible 
criticisms on our simplicity or arbitrariness of the assumptions employed 
in our model. In particular, the abstraction from terms of trade by 
assuming a single commodity growth model may exaggerate the effect of the 
difference of the savings behavior between low-income and high income 
countries. 
We do hope, however, that this paper will generate more interest in 
the global analysis of a non-linear economic system. The recent revival of 
the theory of economic growth (e.g. Lucas 1988, Romer 1986) seems to 
suggest that the natural direction of research is towards non-linear models 
of development. In mathematics, in many natural sciences and in some 
social sciences, new interest is emerging on the global behavior of 
non-linear systems ... not to mention the highly popularized topics such as 
chaos (cf. Day 1982, 1983) and fractal geometry. This paper, we believe, 
presents just one example of many approaches in these growing related areas 
of study that seem to be potentially effective to improve our understanding 
of the evolutionary process in our economic universe. 
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Figure 1 
GNP per capita and saving ratio of 104 countries in 1986. 
Note: The saving ratio is the ratio of gross domestic saving to gross 
do~estic product. The data taken from World Bank, World Development Report 
of 1986, Table 1 and Table 5. All the available data are plotted. 
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Figure 2 
Fitted nonlinear saving function. 
Note: The data are the same as in Figure 1. The extreme observation of 
Lesotho is excluded. The second order polynomial curve is fitted by 
ordinary least-squares method. The fitted equation is 
Y-= 11.137 + 3.2X - 0.167SX2 R - 0.49.
where Y and X were saving ratio (percent) and GNP per capita (thousand 
dollars) respectively. 
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Figure 6 
Four Regions 
I: The path converges to the co-prosperity 
II: Country 1 becomes an empire, equilibrium C. 
III: Country 2 becomes an empire 
IV: The path converges to the starvation equilibrium 0 
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Figure 8(a) L xi > 1.68 
1-1 
I: The path converges to the ~Q:::R[OSR~ritI 
II: Country 1 and 2 become empires. 
III: Country 2 and 3 become empires. 
IV: Country 1 and 3 become empires. 
V: Country 1 becomes an empire. 
VI: Country 2 becomes an empire. 





Figure 8(b) 1.68 > L xi > 0.717 
i-1 








Figure 8(d) 0.173 > I xi> 0 
i-1 
